Quản trị công ty và lợi nhuận của các ngân hàng thương mại Việt Nam

Nội dung text: Quản trị công ty và lợi nhuận của các ngân hàng thương mại Việt Nam

1. Hội nghị Sinh viên nghiên cứu khoa học năm học 2018-2019 QUẢN TRỊ CÔNG TY VÀ LỢI NHUẬN CỦA CÁC NGÂN HÀNG THƯƠNG MẠI VIỆT NAM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROFITABILITY OF VIETNAMESE COMMERCIAL BANKS GVHD: ThS. Võ Hoàng Diễm Trinh SVTH: Lê An Khương Trường Đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng Ankhuongle2910@gmail.com TÓM TẮT Nghiên cứu xem xét tác động của quản trị công ty đến lợi nhuận của các ngân hàng thương mại Việt Nam bằng cách sử dụng dữ liệu bảng của 26 ngân hàng thương mại trong giai đoạn 12 năm từ 2007 đến 2018. Bài nghiên cứu này sử dụng phương pháp hồi quy bình phương nhỏ nhất tổng thể và mô hình ảnh hưởng cố định để kiểm tra mối quan hệ giữa quản trị công ty và lợi nhuận ngân hàng. Quản trị doanh nghiệp được đo lường bởi các biến như phần trăm sở hữu của nhà nước, thành viên độc lập trong hội đồng quản trị, quy mô của hội đồng quản trị và thành viên nữ trong hội đồng quản trị. Các kết quả chỉ ra là tồn tại mối quan hệ dương giữa sở hữu nhà nước và lợi nhuận ngân hàng. Trong khi đó, thành viên độc lập có tác động tiêu cực lên lợi nhuận. Quy mô hội đồng quản trị có tác động tích cực lên ROA. Mối quan hệ giữa thành viên nữ trong hội đồng quản trị và lợi nhuận ngân hàng cho thấy không có ý nghĩa thống kê. Từ khóa: Quản trị công ty, lợi nhuận ngân hàng, Việt Nam, Ngân hàng thương mại Việt Nam ABSTRACT The study examines the effect of corporate governance on bank profitability in the Vietnamese context by using panel data of 26 commercial banks during the period of twelve years from 2007 to 2018. This paper employs pooled the OLS, fixed- effect model (FEM) to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and bank profitability. A set of variables including state ownership, board independence, board size, and female board members is proxy for corporate governance. The results indicate that the relationship between state ownership and bank profitability is significantly positive. Whereas, the board independence and profitability have a significantly negative effect on profitability. Board size has a significantly positive effect on profitability in term of ROA. There is no sign of significant in the relation between female board members and bank profitability. Keywords: Corporate governance, bank profitability, profitability, Vietnam, Vietnamese commercial banks 1. Introduction 1.1. Background and research motivation Corporate governance is a topic that has drawn considerable attention in academic circles, governments, corporations as well as banking, especially since the collapse of many big companies in the US and the UK. In Asia, it is believed that weak corporate governance is the main reason causing the banking crisis in 1997. In addition, the remuneration policy for the executive director of the bank is one of the main reasons for the 2008 US financial crisis. Therefore, corporate governance should be concerned and examined deeply. In Vietnam, corporate governance is considered as a long-term factor to change the business mindset 27
2. Trường Đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng in order to meet the requirements of the global economy. In the context of banking, because of its special features, commercial activities of commercial banks suffer a lot of risks and strongly impact on the national economy so corporate governance surely takes an important role. Although the empirical evidence of the relationship between corporate governance and bank’s performance is documented with different approaches around the world, this relationship has not been studied comprehensively in Vietnam. Therefore, I would like to contribute to the literature in Vietnam by providing a more detailed insight of the effect of corporate governance on bank profitability. 1.2. Research objectives The objective of this study is to figure out the relationship between corporate governance and the profitability of Vietnamese Commercial banks. The research aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and the bank’s profitability. In addition, the research also provides implications for policymakers and managers to review the regulations relating to corporate governance as well as the bank’s profitability. 1.3. Research structure This paper begins with the main theories including agency theory and resource- based theory and some research discuss about this topic around the world. Section two discusses hypothesizes, empirical models as well as methods investigating in the research. Next section goes into detailed description of the sample, correlation matrix and results of pooled OLS, FEM and GMM methods. Finally, some discussions and implications are given for bank managers and policy makers based on results. 1.4. Literature review Firstly, this study investigates the impact of corporate governance on bank profitability on the fundamental of two basic theories including agency theory and resource-based theory. Agency theory, which derived from economic theory, is developed by Alchian & Demsetz (1972), then Jensen & Meckling continued to develop in 1976. They conduct combination of factors from three theories including agency theory, property cost theory and finance theory. In more detail, it provides that agency problem occurs when ownership of resources is separate from managing resources. Therefore, Asma'a Al-Amarneh (2014) suggests that it is important to have good corporate governance to solve problems related to agents. The resource-based theory which is introduced by S.A. Lipman & Rumelt (1982), Wernerfelt (1984), Dierickx & Cool (1989), Grant (1996), Helfat & Peteraf (2003), especially Barney (1996, 1991) says that to attain and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage, company’s resources play an important role. Firms will have a good performance if they own valuable resources and suitably use with their strategies. Because resources are not generated by themselves to gain sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 2001). They need a board of directors who contribute in establishing the achievement of sustainable competitive advantage of the firm through corporate governance. This can be seen clearly in the research of Rahman & Mohamed Ali (2006). The important role of corporate governance and bank profitability is confirmed again. Studies referred to the relation between corporate governance and bank profitability around the world have been widely published and mainly focus on ownership and board. Pi & Timme (1993) indicate that cost efficiency and return on assets (ROA) have a negative correlation with Chairman-CEO duality and are unrelated to the proportion of inside (outside) directors. Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian (2002) use a sample of USA firms during the year of 1999 and find that the proportion of external directors is negatively related to internal stock ownership. CEO- Chairman duality is less while insider stock ownership increase. Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian (2009) take a sample of the largest bank holding companies (BHCs) headquartered in the US and suggest that there is a positive relation between CEO pay- for- performance sensitivity (PPS), board independence, capital and, earnings, whereas a negative relationship between them and earnings management is found. Praptiningsih (2009) investigates a sample of 52 firms in Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia. The result shows that there is an insignificant relationship between internal 28
3. Hội nghị Sinh viên nghiên cứu khoa học năm học 2018-2019 control monitoring mechanisms and corporate performance. The results of Arouri, H, Hossain (2011) show that governance variables such as CEO duality and board size appear insignificant impact on performance. Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid (2012) consider that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporative entities), exhibit significantly higher stock return and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporation governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to bank’s performance during the crisis. Adams & Mehran (2012) recognize that there is no correlation between board independence and performance. Duc (2013) concludes that female board members, CEO duality, working experience of board members, the working experience of board members, and the compensation of board members have the positive effects on ROA, while board size produces negative ones. Al-Amarneh (2014) suggests that board size increases, the bank performance increases. Vo & Nguyen (2014) conduct study with Vietnamese firms and find that there is a positive correlation between duality role of the CEO and firm performance. Azeez (2015) concludes the correlation of board size with firm performance is negative whereas the separation of CEO and chairman has a significant positive relationship with the firm performance. Akshita, Chandan (2016) suggest the larger board members are, the better performance is. Paniagua, Rivelles, & Sapena (2018) indicate that a higher number of board members, a lower ROE is. 2. Hypotheses development and methodology Based on agency theory, resource-based theory, and the listed research, four hypothesizes will be tested in this study. The first hypothesis (H1) is there is a positive relationship between state ownership and bank profitability. The second one (H2) is board independence and bank profitability have a positive correlation. The third hypothesis (H3) is there is a negative relationship between board size and bank profitability. And the final one (H4) is the correlation between female board members and bank profitability is positive. Data was collected from the Stoxplus database and hand- collected from annual financial statements Vietnamese commercial banks during the 12- year period from 2007 to 2018. Twelve years of data are considered for each of 26 commercial banks resulting in a panel dataset of 312 bank-year observations and the data is composed of some missing bank-year observations due to data unavailability. Based on the conceptual framework of previous papers like James & Joseph (2015), Al-Amarneh (2014), Bhagat & Bolton (2008), Duc (2013), to examine the relationship between corporate governance and profitability in Vietnamese commercial banks, a panel data regression model was adopted in the analysis The baseline model is first regressed by using pooled OLS estimation to investigate whether corporate governance has effects on bank profitability. However, the stability and efficiency of the coefficients in panel data analysis based on the pooled OLS regression may be doubted. To handle obstacles relating to unobserved heterogeneity which is one of the most frequent occurrences in empirical studies (Badi H. Baltagi, 2005), the Fixed- effect model (FEM) is used. Wintoki, Linck, & Netter (2012) argue that the errors related to endogenous problems still exist in testing this relationship that makes the result from using OLS or FE to estimate will be biased, especially with short-table data (Cameron, 2008) so the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is employed. In this study, bank profitability (PROFIT) is measured by ROA and ROE. ROA is calculated by dividing net income by total assets and shows that ability of firms in generating income from assets (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Weisbach, 1988; Hadi, Abdul, & Corporate, 2007). Meanwhile ROE is defined as the ratio of net income to total equity and is considered a measure of how effectively management is using a company’s assets to create profits (Pathan & Faff, 2013). In term of corporate governance (CG), this paper uses various variables including State ownership (STATE) to measure the structure of ownership by considering the proportion of holding shares by the government. (Bai, Liu, Lu, & Song, 2004); board 29
4. Trường Đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng independence (BRIND) is referred to the number of independent members in board (James & Joseph, 2015; Rashid & Khan, 2014; Liang et al., 2013; Praptiningsih, 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; R. Adams & Mehran, 2003; Booth et al., 2002; Weisbach, 1988); board size (BOARD) is calculated by considering how many members there are in the board of banks (James & Joseph, 2015; Al-Amarneh, 2014; Hasan & Xie, 2012; Praptiningsih, 2009; Coles et al., 2008 ; R. Adams & Mehran, 2003) and female board members (FEB) is the numbers of women present on the board (Duc, 2013), (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006), (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003), (Kochan et al., 2003), (Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997). Control variables consist of bank size, efficiency ratio, deposit ratio, loan ratio, loan loss provision and dummy year. 3. Result Descriptive statics is firstly investigated in the study to describe features of a specific data set by giving short summaries about the sample and measures of the data. Table 4. 1 Statistical summary of variables Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max ROA 305 0.010 0.009 -0.060 0.060 ROE 304 0.105 0.073 0.0007 0.445 STATE 266 0.217 0.293 0 1 BRIND 303 0.842 0.921 0 7 BOARD 303 7.145 1.910 3 15 FEB 289 1.125 1.086 0 5 BKSIZE 306 13.829 0.565 12.309 15.118 DEP 307 0.686 0.147 0.269 0.967 EFF 304 -0.51 0.14 -0.930 -0.160 LOA 306 0.538 0.127 0.114 0.845 LLP 304 0.009 0.007 0.0003 0.052 Source: Research findings Table 4.1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. It can be seen clearly that ROA ranges from a minimum value of -0.06 to a maximum value of 0.06 and a mean equal to 0.01. While, ROE ranges from a minimum value of 0.0007 to a maximum value of 0.445 and a mean equal to 0.101. In term of independent variables, the mean of STATE displayed in table 4.1 is 0.217 with standard deviation is 0.293, while the min value is 0 and the max value is 1. In addition to that, the number of independent members in board ranges from 0 to 7 members and the mean value of BRIND is 0.842 with the standard deviation is 0.921. Meanwhile, the range BOARD is from 3 to 15 and its mean is 7.145 with standard deviation is 1.910. Similarly, FEB has a mean value of 1.125 with standard deviation is 1.086 and the minimum and maximum value is 0 and 5 Table 4.2 Correlation matrix among variables LL ROA ROE STATE BRIND BOARD FEB BKSIZE DEP EFF LOA P ROA 1.000 ROE 0.757 1.000 STATE 0.096 0.270 1.000 30
5. Hội nghị Sinh viên nghiên cứu khoa học năm học 2018-2019 BRIND -0.121 -0.118 -0.110 1.000 BOARD 0.129 0.275 0.149 0.090 1.000 FEB -0.121 0.027 0.238 0.070 0.293 1.000 BKSIZE -0.187 0.292 0.391 0.025 0.435 0.266 1.000 DEP -0.102 -0.053 0.055 0.031 0.128 0.066 0.264 1.000 EFF 0.522 0.514 0.019 0.048 0.045 0.001 0.052 0.176 1.000 LOA -0.013 0.059 0.306 0.002 0.051 0.079 0.232 0.572 0.188 1.000 1.0 LLP -0.171 -0.042 0.252 -0.007 0.032 -0.090 0.309 0.244 -0.137 0.100 00 Sources: Research findings Table 4.2 illustrates the correlation matrix of both dependent and independent variables. All of the correlation coefficients in table 4.2 are less than 0.8. Following Klein's rule of thumb, it can be concluded that the independent variables in the equation are not multicollinear Table 4.3 shows the pooled OLS and FEM results. In general, OLS regression results show that corporate governance has effects on bank profitability. In detail, the correlation coefficients of state ownership (STATE) with return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are positive (0.0066 and 0.0553, in turn) at 1% significance level. This result is also consistent with previous research result of Viet & Vinh (2016) in Vietnam. Surprisingly, the relationship between ROA, ROE and board independence is negative (- 0.00012 and -0.0117 respectively) and they are statistically significant at 1% level. Both ROA and ROE are found having the significant positive relationship with board size. This indicates that the profitability of banks increases with bigger board members. In contrast, there is a negative correlation between ROA, ROE and female board member at significant levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. Table 4.3 Pooled OLS, FE regression results of model DEPENDENT VARIABLES: ROA & ROE OLS FEM VARIABLES ROA ROE ROA ROE STATE 0.0066 0.0553 0.0168 0.1587 (3.91) (3.40) (2.87) (2.94) BRIND -0.0012 -0.0117 -0.0014 -0.0122 (-2.62) (-2.73) (-3.45) (-3.20) BOARD 0.0013 0.0089 0.0008 0.0021 (5.34) (3.79) (3.14) (0.84) FEB -0.0013 -0.0093 -0.0005 0.0013 (-2.98) (-2.19) (-0.98) (0.28) BKSIZE -0.0050 0.0301 -0.0064 0.0112 (-5.52) (3.43) (-4.81) (0.92) DEP -0.0067* -0.1130 -0.0186 -0.2093 (-1.79) (-3.12) (-5.32) (-6.50) 31
6. Trường Đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng EFF 0.0009 0.0083 0.0009 0.0085 (11.11) (10.74) (13.56) (13.48) LOA -0.0028 -0.0214 0.0021 0.0482 (-0.66) (-0.52) (0.47) (1.18) LLP -0.0499 -0.5699 -0.0808 -1.3038 (-0.76) (-0.90) (-1.26) (-2.21) Constant 0.0785 -0.2683 0.1033 0.0461 (6.80) (-2.41) (5.60) (0.27) Observations 249 249 249 249 R-squared 0.4620 0.4647 0.6245 0.5629 Year dummies YES YES YES YES Adjusted R-squared 0.442 0.445 0.361 0.342 Number of ID 25 25 t-statistics in parentheses p<0.01, p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: Research findings Turning to the results of FEM, both ROA and ROE are found to have a significant positive relationship with state ownership (STATE). The coefficients of ROA and ROE with state ownership (STATE) are 0.0168 and 0.1587, respectively at the 1% significant level. These results are consistent with previous research results of Viet & Vinh (2016) in Vietnam as well as Barth, Jr, & Levine (2004) and Berger et al., (2005) in developing countries. This indicates that banks having higher percentage of state ownership make larger profit than those having lower percentage state ownership. Therefore, there is enough evidence to accept hypothesis H1. Next, there is a negative relationship between ROA, ROE and board independence with the significant levels are 0.1. It is very clear to see that the results of FEM is the same with those of pooled OLS model. Based on that, hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. This result is similar with the previous study conducted by Adams (2011), Erkens et al., (2012), Aebi et al., (2012) and completely consistent with results of Viet & Vinh (2016) investigating in Vietnamese banks. The results also indicate that the board independent members have not effectively worked in their own roles. Meanwhile, the coefficients reveal that board size positively affects ROA at 10% significance level. In this case, because the relationship between board size and ROE shows no significance so there are not enough evidence to confirm hypothesis H3. This relation is consistent with the prior studies supported by Andres & Vallelado (2008), Germain, Galy, & Lee (2014), Liang et al. (2013) and especially the results of Binh & Giang (2012) conducting in Vietnam. Plus, the insignificant finding is found by Rashid & Khan (2014) and Kumar & Singh (2013). This can be explained that larger boards may enable board make better decisions as well as plans because of the well coordinating and allocating of resources in strategic management. In term of female board members, there is no significant relationship between the female board member and bank profitability though the correlation between them are negative and consistent with results of Dao & Hoang (2012). Therefore, it is not able to accept the hypothesis H4. Turning to the group of control variables, BKSIZE, DEP, EFF, LOA, LLP have statistically significant coefficients. Bank size and profitability have a significant negative relation but only in term of ROA. DEP 32
7. Hội nghị Sinh viên nghiên cứu khoa học năm học 2018-2019 and profitability (both ROA and ROE) also have the significant negative correlation. Whereas, there is a significant positive relationship between EFF and ROA, ROE. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is employed to control the unobserved heterogeneity of pooled OLS and handle the existing endogenous factors in FE model. The GMM results are presented in table 4.4. It is very clear that GMM findings are similar to with results of pooled OLS and FEM. Moreover, GMM regression results give strong significance in the relationship among ROA, ROE and independent variables (STATE, BRIND, BOARD, FEB). Therefore, it can be concluded that the results of the model have a high significant level. Table 4.4: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression results DEPEDENT VARIABLES VARIABLES ROA ROE STATE 0.00353 0.0662 (0.00109) (0.00920) BRIND -0.00115 -0.0116 (0.000297) (0.00250) BOARD 0.000874 0.0104 (0.000158) (0.00133) FEB -0.00172 -0.00799 (0.000292) (0.00246) BKSIZE 0.00100 0.00964 (0.000137) (0.00116) DEP -0.00751 -0.112 (0.00253) (0.0213) EFF 0.000844 0.00848 (5.36e-05) (0.000451) LOA -0.00161 -0.0251 (0.00285) (0.0240) LLP -0.153 -0.232 (0.0430) (0.362) Observations 249 249 Number of id 25 25 t-statistics in parentheses p<0.01, p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: Research findings 4. Summary and Conclusion The objective of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance on Vietnamese commercial bank profitability. A panel data collecting from 26 commercial banks during 12 years from 2007 33
8. Trường Đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng to 2018 in Vietnam is used. After running the pooled OLS, FEM and GMM which is employed to check the results, the findings show that there is a relationship between corporate governance and bank profitability. In more detail, firstly, state ownership has a significant positive correlation with bank profitability at the 1% significant level. These results are consistent with previous research results of Viet & Vinh (2016) in Vietnam as well as Barth, Jr, & Levine (2004) and Berger et al., (2005) in developing countries. It is very clear to see that banks which have high proportion state ownership rank in top of the biggest bank in Vietnam. Take a quick look into the market share of Vietnamese commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks control majority market share. These banks receive more incentives as well as preferences of government in terms of customers, service providing or network than others. Therefore, this result is still consistent with the context of banking in Vietnam. Secondly, it is found that there is a negative relationship between board independence and profitability. In the reality of Vietnamese commercial banks, the number of independent members in board is small which can lead to disabling the role of independent members in protecting the rights and legitimate interests of minority shareholders and stakeholders, including the state. In addition, becoming board independent members to promote their own role well, they must meet the requirements specified in the law and have good professional experience. However it is very difficult to satisfy both requirements in Vietnam. Therefore, the quality of board independent members in Vietnamese commercial banks is still concern. Thirdly, the size of the board has significantly positively effect on ROA, implying that the larger members in board is, a better return on asset is. This result can be explained by the resource theory that suggests banks having larger size are likely to achieve better corporate performance using ROA because the collaboration of the various skills, expertise and knowledge from board members in meetings. Finally, a significant negative relationship is found between female board members and profitability. This findings of this study provide various implications for commercial bank managers and policy makers in Vietnam. Firstly, these results add significant evidence to the existing literature as they expand our understanding about how does the corporate governance affect bank profitability in the context of Vietnamese commercial banks through agency theory and resource-based theory perspective. Although the empirical results show that the state ownership and bank profitability have a significantly positive relationship, it does not really indicate that government should increase the percentage of shareholding to achieve more profitability in commercial banks. According to World Bank, the high percentage of state- owned in commercial banks tends to reduce financial development, reduce competition among banks, limit access to credit, bear a higher risk of crisis and conflict between interests and motivation. In addition, the independent members in board do not really work effectively so it is necessary for the board in Vietnamese commercial banks to evaluate and organize board independence suitably. Next, expanding board size partly enables to increase the return on asset. Because when the number of members in board increases, while maintain conditions as the role and supervise the operation of the executive committee, which helps reducing agency costs, thereby improving management capability and improve the profitability of commercial banks. REFERENCES [1] Adams. (2011). Governance and the Financial Crisis. International Review of Finance, 12, 7–38. [2] Adams, R. B., & Licht, A. N. (2011). Shareholders and Stakeholders : How do Directors Decide ? Shareholders and Stakeholders : How do Directors. Strategic Management Journal, 32(12)(March), 1331–1355. [3] Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board structure and performance : Evidence for large bank holding companies. J. Finan. Intermediation, 21, 243–267. [4] Adams, R., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Federal Bank of New York, (212). 34
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