Tác động của thành quả hoạt động lên hành vi quản trị lợi nhuận và giá trị thích hợp của lợi nhuận: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam

Nội dung text: Tác động của thành quả hoạt động lên hành vi quản trị lợi nhuận và giá trị thích hợp của lợi nhuận: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam

1. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE ON THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND REASONABLE VALUE OF EARNINGS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN VIETNAM STOCK MARKET TÁC ĐỘNG CỦA THÀNH QUẢ HOẠT ĐỘNG LấN HÀNH VI QUẢN TRỊ LỢI NHUẬN VÀ GIÁ TRỊ THÍCH HỢP CỦA LỢI NHUẬN: BẰNG CHỨNG THỰC NGHIỆM TẠI THỊ TRƯỜNG CHỨNG KHOÁN VIỆT NAM Anh Hoang Thi Phuong, Minh Le Thi Hong, Dan Tran Nguyen University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City minhtcdn@ueh.edu.vn ABSTRACT This paper aims to examine the impact of the corporate performance on earnings management and reasonable value of earnings by using a sample of 218 companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) in the period of 2012 - 2016.The results show that poor-operating performance companies are motivated to implement earnings management through discretionary accruals than high operating performance companies. The research suggests that the performance that businesses achieved has an impact on earnings management of managers. Besides, we also find that the poor performance companies have lower reasonable value of corporate earnings than that of high performing companies. Keywords: Performance, earnings management, reasonable value. TểM TẮT Bằng việc sử dụng một mẫu gồm 218 cụng ty được niờm yết trờn thị trường chứng khoỏn TP.HCM (HOSE) trong giai đoạn từ năm 2012 - 2016, mục tiờu của bài nghiờn cứu này nhằm kiểm định tỏc động của thành quả hoạt động của doanh nghiệp đến hành vi quản trị lợi nhuận và giỏ trị thớch hợp của lợi nhuận. Kết quả nghiờn cứu cho thấy rằng, những cụng ty cú thành quả hoạt động kộm cú động cơ thực hiện hành vi quản trị lợi nhuận thụng qua cỏc khoản kế toỏn dồn tớch cú thể điều chỉnh được (DAC) hơn những cụng ty cú thành quả hoạt động cao. Những kết quả này cho thấy rằng, thành quả hoạt động mà doanh nghiệp đạt được cú tỏc động lờn hành vi quản trị lợi nhuận của cỏc nhà quản trị. Bờn cạnh đú, chỳng tụi cũn thấy rằng, giỏ trị thớch hợp của lợi nhuận của những cụng ty cú thành quả hoạt động kộm thỡ thấp hơn so với cỏc cụng ty cú thành quả hoạt động cao. Từ khúa: Thành quả hoạt động, quản trị lợi nhuận, giỏ trị thớch hợp. 1. Introduction Managers believe that earnings on the financial statement will affect the decision of investors and creditors. Therefore, they have tendency to manipulate the earnings of company. By this way, they may attract more financial resources. Especially low-performing enterprises‟s managers usually use this technique to enhance the quality of earnings as a measure of a frm‟s performance or to manipulate earnings to beneft managers‟ own interests (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Jiraporn et al., 2008). The earnings management is the act of using techniques to change the accounting parameters on the financial statements in order to achieve profits at the discretion of the manager. When managers seek to manage company‟s earnings, they are looking for ways to increase their personal benefits, disguise the company's real performance and hide valuable information in financial statement from stakeholders (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). In addition, because the directors believe that the earnings on the financial statements will affect the decisions of investors and creditors, they strive to manage the earnings (Sevin and Schroeder, 2005). Earnings management has become a major concern in recent decades. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to consider whether the performance of an enterprise is an incentive for businesses to conduct earnings management activities and reasonable value (or value relevance) of good earnings or not. The results of this study are intended to contribute more empirical evidences for studies 422
2. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 of earnings management in Vietnam, thereby helping stakeholders who use information on the financial statements have a better view of business, thereby making more appropriate investment decisions. 2. Literature review 2.1. Theoretical overview The earnings management of managers can be explained by the following two main theoretical bases: 2.1.1. Accrual basis According to the accounting standard No.1 in 2002 of Ministry of Finance (Vietnamese Government), based on the accrual basis, all economic and financial operations of the enterprise relate to assets, liabilities, owners' equity, turnover and expenses must be recorded in the accounting book at the time of arising, not based on the actual time of collection or actual payment of money or cash equivalents. Financial statements are prepared based on accrual principle reflecting the financial situation of enterprises in the past, present and future. This makes financial statements fully reflect the accounting transactions in the period. However, the accrual basis makes the recognition of revenue and expense not based on the corresponding cash flow collected or spent on the time of the transaction. Especially the recognition is influenced by the subjective will of the managers to implement earnings management. 2.1.2. Agency theory The theory of agency by Jensen and Meckling published in 1976 shows the distinction between rights and interests of managers and owners. This leads to a conflict of interests between the two parties. Managers can make decisions that benefit themselves and intentionally hide important information, thereby causing information asymmetry between stakeholders. Therefore, investors will require a higher rate of returns to compensate for the risks on these issues, making the value of the business decrease. In order to improve this issue, managers implement earnings managements to change some information on the financial statements in order to increase corporate‟s value in financial market. 2.2. Overview of previous studies Research by Yoon and Miller (2002), using a sample of 663 Korean industrial companies in the period 1994-1997. The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between performance and earnings management. By adjusted -Jones model in 1995, the research results show that companies with poor performance have tend to choose an earnings management strategy to increase profits in financial statement. Study of Yoon et al. (2006), had conducted on 2,895 observations during the period 1995-2001, to examine the methods that Korean businesses use when they want to increase or decrease their earnings on financial statements. The results also show that low-performing enterprises tend to increase non-cash costs as a bad debt expense, loss of transfer as the reasons of earnings decreasing. Businesses with high operating results tend to increase earnings on the report by recording additional income from capital transfer. Hunt et al. (2000), conducted a study on a sample of 2,225 enterprises in the US market between 1982 and 1994, to consider earnings smoothing would increase or decrease the information of earnings. The paper has concluded that the earnings can change level of earnings management and the smoother earnings the better the information of earnings (i.e. the reasonable value of earnings). It means that the more earnings management is, the more reasonable value of earnings will be. The study of Tucker and Zarowin (2006), studied a sample of 17,019 observations in the period from 1988–2000, to check whether the smoothing of earnings (earnings management) would distort or improve the information of earnings (reasonable value of earnings). Through Collins's method in 1994, 423
3. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 the paper concluded that the company's current stock price with smoother earnings (more earnings management) contains more information about future earnings rather than companies that make less smooth earnings, meaning earnings management improves reasonable value of earnings. The research of Warfield et al. (1995), studied sample of 1,348 companies in the UK during 1988- 1990. Data taken from the Securities and Exchange Commission in the UK, found evidence that earnings management makes earnings on reports less meaningful to investors. Research by Christensen et al. (1999), collected data from 483 income reports of 47 US insurance companies in the period of 1989-1992, to consider the relationship between the motives of the company‟s directors manage the earnings to value information of earnings. The research has shown that the more earnings management is the less reasonable value of earnings it is for investors. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004), performed on a sample of 192 companies that shares secondary issuing in the period 1984-1991 in the US, with the aim of finding out the impact of earnings management on the reasonable value of earnings through stock price. By the revised Jones model (1991) presented in the study of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), the paper shows the reduction in the reasonable value of earnings in the year in which the offering of secondary shares takes place. The study of Habib (2004), was conducted on a sample of 5318 observations in the period 1992-1999. The research objective was to find the impact of earnings management on the reasonable value of earnings of accounting information in the Japanese companies. The paper shows that earnings management has a negative impact on the reasonable value of earnings. Cheng and Li's research (2014), in the Chinese market during the period 2003-2008, aimed at examining the impact of earnings "make-up" on information of earnings. The study shows that earnings- making up in state-owned companies do not affect the information of earnings in contrast with companies in private sector. Mostafa's study (2017), uses data of enterprises on the Egyptian stock market from 2003-2009 to study the impact of earnings management on the reasonable value of earnings. Using the revised Jones model (1991) presented in the study of Dechow et al. (1995), research results show that low-performing enterprises conduct earnings management to obscuring their low performance (assuming high-performing businesses will not be motivated to implement earnings management). 3. Research methodology 3.1. Data Data of paper included 208 enterprises were listed on HOSE continuously in the research period from 2012-2016. Data source is taken from Datastream of Thomson Reuters. 3.2. Research Model 3.2.1. Estimating the relationship between firm performance and earnings management Based on accruals, when earnings management occurs, there will be a difference amount between cash flow on cash flow statement and earnings on income statement. The researchers call this variable TAC- total cumulative accrual. According to Dechow et al (1995), TAC can be calculated using the following formula: TAC= (ΔCA- ΔCash) – (ΔCL – ΔSTD) – DEP (In which: ΔCA: changes in short-term assets, ΔCash: changes in cash and cash equivalents, ΔCL: changes in short-term debt, ΔSTD: changes in short-term bank loans, DEP: depreciation). In addition, according to Mostafa (2017), TAC can be calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary items minus the operating cash flow (TAC = Earnings -CFO). We selected this calculation because the formula is simple and gives the same results. 424
4. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 In TAC, there are 2 parts: the Discretionary Accruals (DAC) and the accrual accounting cannot be adjusted (Non-Discretionary Accruals –NDAC). The NDAC variable reflects the business conditions of each company so managers cannot manipulate it. According to previous studies, to adjust earnings, managers will pass the DAC variable. Thus, DAC represents the level of earnings management of businesses. The bigger the DAC, the more earnings are managed. However, according to Healy and Wahlen (1999), DAC estimation models may get parameter deviation causing DAC errors. Therefore, in the process of research, we compare both TAC and DAC parameters to make the best conclusions about earnings management between companies with high and low performance. This study uses CFO to represent the performance of enterprises such as previous studies: McNichols and Wilson (1998), DeAngelo (1988), Givoly and Hayn (2000); Barth et al (2001); Yoon and Miller (2002); Mostafa (2017). The companies with high performance will have CFO> 0 and vice versa, companies with low performance will have CFO 0), companies with high performance will not manage earnings (TAC, DAC < 0). This may conclude that: enterprises with high operating performance are not motivated to implement earnings managements, while those with poor performance, may seek to manage earnings to hide their weak business performance. For more accurate results, research conducted to calculate the difference between Mean DAC, TAC of the group of enterprises with low and high operating performances. We use t-statistic to test the significance of this difference. The positive and significant difference will show that the level of earnings management at the companies with low performance is higher than the group with high performance. Therefore, the better relationship between performance and earnings management can be concluded. 425
5. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 Table 1: Description of variables in the earnings management model Variable Sign Description This variable is an earnings item before an extraordinary item. Earnings Earnings Earnings variable is divided by the total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity problem. Operating This variable is the operating cash flow. CFO variable is divided by the total CFO cash flow assets to reduce heteroskedasticity problem. Total accrual This variable is calculated by the formula: cumulative TAC TAC = Earnings - CFO accounting (earnings before the extraordinary item minus the operating cash flow). This variable is calculated by the formula: Change in ΔREV ΔREV = REV – REV turn over t t (t-1) (revenues of year t minus revenues of year t-1) Changing in This variable is calculated by the formula: company‟s ΔAR ΔARt = ARt- AR(t-1) receivables (receivables of year t minus receivable in year t-1) Fixed Asset PPE This variable is collected from fixed asset item in financial statement 3.2.2. Estimating the relationship between performance and reasonable value The reasonable value of earnings is the value of earnings that reflects the operating performance of the business, so this value does not negatively affect investors. The reasonable value of earnings is represented by the earnings response coefficient. According to previous studies (Easton and Harri (1991), Lev and Zarowin (1999), Francis and Schipper (1999), Hellstrửm (2006); Ragab and Omran (2006); Filip and Raffournier (2010), we use pooled regression model OLS to estimate the earnings response coefficient as follows: Rit = αo + α1.ΔEit + α2.Eit + єit (Model 2) In which: - Rit: Annual net enterprises‟s rate of returns. - ΔEit: Change in net earnings before the extraordinary items of firms. - Eit: Net earnings of enterprises. The estimated coefficient (α1 + α2) in model 2 is the earnings response coefficient. Positive and significant value (α1 + α2) implies that earning is reasonable value and vice versa if (α1 + α2) is negative and significant, earning is unreasonable value. In order to examine the impact of the performance factor, we based on Mostafa's research (2017) by adding dummy variables to determine the differences in the coefficient of earning responses coefficient between companies with high and low operating performances. The research model is described as follows: Rit = βo+ β1.ΔEit + β2.Eit + β3.Dit.ΔEit + β4.Dit.Eit + єit (Model 3) In which, the coefficient β1 + β2 is the earnings regression coefficient of enterprises with high operating performance; (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4) is the earnings response coefficient of low-performing 426
6. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 enterprises, (β3 + β4) is the difference in the coefficient of earning response between companies with low and high operating performance. Positive values (β1 + β2) and (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4) imply that firms with high and low performance are reasonable value. Therefore, in this paper we expect that the coefficients (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4) are negative to reflect the impact of low performance on the reasonable value of earnings. Because low-performing companies will have an incentive for earnings management, this will make the information of earnings fall, the reasonable value is smaller, so the earning responses coefficient is small and may have a negative value. Similarly, the study expects the coefficient (β1 + β2) to be positive to clearly reflect the impact of high performance on the reasonable value of earnings, because these companies are not motivated executing earnings management, therefore, the reasonable value of earnings is also high, leading to a higher earning response coefficient than a company with low performance and may be positive. And finally, the study expects the coefficient β3 + β4 to be negative, because this is the difference in earning coefficient of the company with low and high performance (= (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4) - (β1 + β2)), the earning response coefficient of the company with low performance minus the earning response coefficient of the company with high performance, which implies that the reasonable value of earnings of businesses with poor performance is less than the reasonable value of earnings of enterprises with high performance. Table 2: Description of variables in reasonable value models (models 2 and 3) Variable Sign Description Wael (2017), R is calculated by the formula: Pt Dt company „s R ln R annual net Pt 1 rate of returns (with Pt: closing price of the company's stock price at year t, Dt: the company's dividend at year t, Pt-1: closing price of the company's stock price at year t-1 This variable is calculated by the formula: Change ΔE = E -E ΔE it it (i,t-1) Earnings (change in net earnings for firm i at year t subtract the net earnings for firm i in year t-1) Net E Net earnings earnings D: is a dummy variable, valued at 0 or 1. D is 0 when the company is Dummy D one of the companies with high performance (company group with CFO> 0) and vice versa D will value equal to 1. 4. Empirical results 4.1. Estimating the impact of performance on corporate’s earnings management. Based on the modified Jones model in 1995, we conducted data collection to calculate the variable DAC - representing the level of earnings management. Through the model, we find DAC by estimating the remaining of each year for all businesses. Then consider the average (mean) and median of the following four variables: EARNING, CFO (operating cash flow), TAC (Total cumulative accruals), DAC (Discretionary Accruals) results help us go to conclusions about the earnings management in two business groups and the entire sample. The results are presented in the following table: 427
7. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 Table 3: Descriptive statistics (EARNINGS, CFO, TAC, DAC, NDAC) Sample high CFO low CFO Media Mean Median Std Mean Std Mean Median Sd n Earnings 0.066 0.044 0.095 0.084 0.062 0.101 0.036 0.027 0.071 CFO 0.047 0.042 0.148 0.123 0.099 0.106 -0.087 -0.056 0.1097 TAC 0.019 0.007 0.145 -0.039 -0.029 0.109 0.123 0.091 0.144 DAC 0.000 -0.010 0.144 -0.057 -0.048 0.110 0.101 0.068 0.143 NDAC 0.019 0.021 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.013 Source: Author’s calculations In the high CFO group: The mean and median values of CFO (0.123; 0.099) were higher than EARNINGS (0.084; 0.062), and Mean and Median of TAC (-0.039; -0.029) were negative, which proved that there is a difference between cash flow and earnings. Besides, Mean and Median of DAC (-0.057, - 0.048) 0 proved that existence of earnings management. Thus, in high-performing companies, there is earnings management. Compare two business groups: The group with CFO> 0 has EARNINGS smaller than CFO and the group with CFO 0, this shows that there is no earnings management. This can be explained by the unbalance sampling of the study between two business groups. The group of enterprises with more high performance included 665 observations, the low performance enterprises only 375 observations. It is because the better operating businesses out number of the versa so the whole sample tends to not implement earnings management, resulting in DAC < 0. In summary, from the results in Table 3, enterprises with high and low performance both have differences between CFO and EARNINGS, however, only the group with low performance is taking actions to manage earnings. Next, the study will find the difference between Mean and Median of TAC, DAC to compare the level of earnings management between two groups of companies. Results are presented in the following two tables: Table 4: Descriptive statistics, the mean difference of TAC and DAC Mean low CFO high CFO Difference T-stat P-value TAC 0.123 -0.039 0.162 20.4337 0.0000 DAC 0.101 -0.057 0. 158 19.9049 0.0000 Source: Author’s calculations 428
8. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 Table 5: Descriptive statistics, the median difference of TAC and DAC Median low CFO high CFO Difference T-stat P-value TAC 0.091 -0.029 0. 120 15.136 0.0000 DAC 0.068 -0.048 0. 116 14.6137 0.0000 Source: Author’s calculations The paper uses t-statistics to test the significance of the difference of mean, median TAC and DAC for two groups of businesses. The results in 2 Tables 4 and 5 show that the difference between two groups is always positive and statistically significant. Specifically, the mean difference of TAC and DAC of the two groups is 0.162 respectively (with t-stastic = 20.4337), 0,158 (with t-stastic = 19.9049), the median difference of TAC and DAC of the two groups respectively is 0.120 (with t-stastic = 15.136), 0,116 (with t-stastic = 14.6137). This shows that companies with low performance always manage earnings more than companies with high performance. This result is also consistent with the results of the statistics description above. 4.2. Estimating the impact of business performance on the reasonable value of earnings Table 6: Regression results of measuring the reasonable value of earnings model R β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 (β1+β2) (β3+β4) (β1+β2+ β3+ β4) Adjusted-R2 0.041 -0.180 0.326 0.271 -0.293 0.0124 -0.022 -0.0096 0.0064 t-statistics 2.1 -2.01 3.12 1.40 -1.51 0.146 -0.11 0.036 p-value 0.038 0.138 0.011 0.168 0.145 Source: Author’s calculations The results in Table 6 show that the regression coefficient (β1 + β2) = 0.0124 tells us the earnings coefficient of the company with high performance is 0.0124, the earnings coefficient of the company low performance is (β1 + β2 + β3 + β4) = -0.0096. The earnings coefficient of a company with low performance is smaller than a company with high performance. Furthermore, the coefficient (β3 + β4) - the difference between the profitability coefficient of the company with low and high operating results- has a value of -0.022, further clarifying the above conclusion. This suggests that companies with low performance are of low reasonable value of earnings (because of their low earnings coefficient) and vice versa those companies with high performance are of reasonable value of earnings (because of the high earnings coefficient). 5. Conclusion Based on data from Vietnamese companies listed on HOSE, this study aims to test the impact of corporate performance on earnings management and the reasonable value of earnings. In particular, the paper examines the effects of low/high performance on the earnings management motivation, thereby impacting the reasonable value of earnings. First, we consider the difference in earnings management among companies with low performance compared to companies with high performance, through DAC (Discretional Accruals). Research results indicate that companies with low performance tend to increase earnings in financial statements (particularly in the Income Statement) than those with high performance. The first reason to explain this behavior of the directors is because that earnings management through this accruals method is only the transfer of earnings of previous period to the next period. Thereby making the earnings superior, helping managers get more benefits. Second, this behavior helps to cover the eyes of investors, raise the company's stock price, and certainly the benefits of the managers are not small. Moreover, the high price of stocks makes investors expect high profitability, which inadvertently puts pressure on administrators to 429
9. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2019 ICYREB 2019 create greater value. Having both external and internal impacts, it is easy for managers of enterprises attempt to take earnings management. After that, we re-examine to see if the reasonable value of earnings of companies with poor performance is different from those of high performing companies. The results show that, the decrease in the value of information of earnings. The reasonable value of earnings of companies with low performance is higher than that of high-performing companies. The paper provides additional empirical evidence on the impact of performance on earnings management and reasonable value of earnings, contributing to the results of debates surrounding this topic. Currently, earnings management is an issue that investors in particular and financial statement‟s users in general are very interested in, because it affects the information of earnings, reasonable value of earnings and especially affect their decisions. We hope that the results of this study will provide more empirical evidence and raise awareness about businesses for stakeholder who uses information in financial statement, for making better investment decisions. REFERENCES [1] Barth, M. E., Cram, D. P., & Nelson, K. K. (2001). Accruals and the prediction of future cash flows. The accounting review, 76(1), 27-58. [2] Cheng, C. A., & Li, S. (2014). Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness?–A Comparison between the US and China Markets. China Accounting and Finance Review, 16(2), 1-20. [3] Christensen, T. E., Hoyt, R. E., & Paterson, J. S. (1999). Ex ante incentives for earnings management and the informativeness of earnings. Journal of Business Finance &Accounting, 26(78), 807-832. [4] DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. Accounting review, 400-420. [5] DeAngelo, L. E. (1988). Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests. Journal of accounting and economics, 10(1), 3-36. [6] Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting review, 193-225. [7] Dechow, P. M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000). “Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators”. Accounting horizons, 14(2), 235-250. [8] DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of accounting and economics, 17(1), 145-176. [9] Easton, P. D., & Harris, T. S. (1991). Earnings as an explanatory variable for returns. Journal of accounting research, 19-36. [10] Francis, J., & Schipper, K. (1999). Have financial statements lost their relevance?. Journal of accounting Research, 37(2), 319-352. [11] Filip, A., & Raffournier, B. (2010). The value relevance of earnings in a transition economy: The case of Romania. The International Journal of Accounting, 45(1), 77-103. [12] Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. [13] Jiraporn, P., Miller, G.A., Yoon, S.S. and Kim, Y.S. (2008), “Is earnings management opportunistic or benefcial? An agency theory perspective”, International Review of Financial Analysis, 17(3), 622-634. [14] Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2000). The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative?. Journal of accounting and economics, 29(3), 287-320. 430
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